Test your AI agents before attackers do

Agents get hijacked

Hostile instructions hide in documents, emails, tickets, web pages, PDFs, and Slack.

By default, an agent obeys them.

Agents exceed their authority

Give an agent access to tools, credentials, and production systems, and prompt injection stops being a content problem.

It becomes an authorization failure.

Agents cause real damage

A compromised agent can leak data, delete files, expose secrets, send messages, and run unsafe code.

We review the design, map the attack surface, run light adversarial testing, and find where the agent has unsafe permissions, weak boundaries, or behaviour your engineers never intended.

You get a concise report with findings rated by severity and a prioritized plan for what to fix next.

We design stronger control layers around what the agent is allowed to do:

• Agent containment and scoped permissions
• Policy-based authorization with systems like Cedar
• Data honeypots and prompt validation
• Human approval gates and defensive monitor models

The result is an agent that is harder to hijack, harder to misuse, and easier to trust.

Our engineers bring a barrage of adversarial techniques, fuzzing strategies, hostile inputs, malicious context, and tool-abuse cases to find out whether your guardrails actually hold.

The result is evidence of where the system breaks, while you still have time to change it.

Agent security moves too quickly to treat as a one-time checklist. We stay available as models, tools, and attack techniques change:

• Periodic retesting
• Briefings on new attack classes
• Review of major architecture changes
• Implementation support
• Fast answers when a new attack technique lands